



On how to integrate large quantities of variable renewables into electricity systems

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
Singapore, 21 June 2017

- 1. Introduction: Motivation**
- 2. How variable renewables impact prices in electricity markets**
- 3. The core problem of capacity payments**
- 4. Flexibility and sector coupling**
- 5. Balancing groups: A future market design**
- 6. Conclusions**

Motivation:

- * **Climate change → Paris agreements**
- * **European targets for renewables → „Clean energy“ winter package**
- * **Competition & democracy**
- * **It is not possible to squeeze variable renewables into the system by violence**

Electricity generation EU-28




... to identify the major boundary conditions to integrate even larger amounts of variable renewables into the electricity system

Very important:

Our reflections apply in principle to every electricity system world-wide;

.... are based on **electricity economic** point-of-view



Expectation of


prices = Short-term marginal costs

(Short-term marginal costs = fuel costs)

**due to huge depreciated excess
capacities at the beginning of
liberalisation!**

2 HOW VARIABLE RENEWABLES IMPACT PRICES IN ELECTRICITY MARKETS

Example: prices without and with PV




RES Production

> Demand


on-river hydro PV Wind Load

Demand

RES Production
< Demand



Key term of the future: Residual load (base load is “dead”)




Residual load = Load – non-flexible generation

Deviation from STMC-pricing in spot markets


Scarcity prices!

Electricity price spot market



**→ These price spreads provide incentives
for new flexible solutions!!!!**

Classified residual load



By a regulated capacity „market“ with STMC pricing?

or

By competition between supply-side and demand-side technologies and behaviour (incl. Storages, grid and other flexibility options) with correct scarcity pricing signals??

Given a price pattern, showing **excess and scarcity prices** it would be attractive for a sufficient number of flexible power plant operators to stay in the market!



REVISED ENERGY-ONLY MARKET


3 THE CORE PROBLEM OF CAPACITY PAYMENTS

Strategic reserves as well as capacity payments for power plants destroy the EOM by providing misleading price signals!


Price peaks at times of scarce resource should revive the markets and lead to the correct quantities from comp markets point-of-view!

4. FLEXIBILITY AND SECTOR COUPLING


Capacity without
ensured payments




Demand for long-term storage



Sector coupling hydrogen: Storage and fuel in transport?



- * In times of surplus generation: How to **use excess electricity** in a meaningful way?




Heating/Cooling




Transport

- * Vague simplified suggestions, no convincing long-term solutions
- * **Central** (Ptx approaches, e.g. H2) vs **decentral** (end user level, E.g. EVs, heat pumps for heating) applications
- * How to **fit use with time of surplus**, e.g. of PV for heating ?



5. THE CORE ROLE OF BALANCING GROUPS




Balancing group: entity in a control area of an electricity system; it has to ensure that at every moment demand and supply is balanced

E.g. municipal utility of Vienna, Singapur, Shanghai


**To meet this target: own generation , storage, flexibility,
Trading in long-term, day-ahead and intraday market**

Every difference → high costs!


New Thinking: Making the electricity system more democratic



Grid parity: PV-costs and household electricity prices



Share of own consumption



6. CONCLUSIONS

- Sustainable electric. system → integrating many technologies & demand-side options!
- Larger market areas favourable
- Very important: correct price signals (incl. CO₂)
- most urgent: exhaust full creativity of all market participants incl. decentralised PV systems
- The key: Flexibility (incl. dispatchable var RES)!
Currently low economic incentives but activities started → very promising!
- Capacity payments: Any CP will distort the system towards more conv. and less RES capacity
- New key player: Balancing group (Supplier), no more the generator